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We analysed the specific case of how information in the financial press influences 
economic bubbles. We found considerable flaws in the information market due to 
several factors: demand, the predominance of what are termed “irrational investors” 
(herding), and supply, which has the problem that the sources of information are biased 
and feeds. 
 
A financial bubble is a deviation between real value of a financial asset and its 
persistent market price in time, which also has a speculative origin fed back by the 
illusion of the owners of these financial values, who will take benefits because of the 
future prices, which must be higher than the previous ones. 
 
The economical information in the media is submitting three problems. First of all, it is 
information generated by companies. In second place, the information circuit is fed 
back. A problem of informative independence becomes created, particularly serious in 
the case of the banks, which are very were as creditors. And in a third place, some 
informative biases are manifested for the companies of regulated sectors which are 
starring the economical information in the media. 
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Media, investors and bubbles 
 
 
1. An interdisciplinary problem  
 
The influence of financial information in the media has been analysed by different 
disciplines, such as communication, sociology, economics and politics.  
 
As economic bubbles are imbalances in the market, the basic approaches to them can 
be divided into those who consider that the market functions well and bubbles are just 
temporary imbalances, and those who believe that these imbalances are structural and 
highlight weaknesses in the way markets operate. In the analysis of bubbles, Markus 
Brunnermeier is the most notable economist who accepts the hypothesis of rationality 
and efficient markets. He is notable for his attempt to construct a complete theoretical 
model on the occurrence of bubbles. According to Brunnermeier, stock brokers are fully 
aware that certain situations are characteristic of a bubble with a predictable 
conclusion, but opinion varies as to when the bubble will burst. Therefore, for 
Brunnermeier, the theoretical problem is to determine the optimum behaviour of agents 
in this environment.  
 
The cause of bubbles is not addressed in Brunnermeier’s model, but at least he 
accepts that they exist. Likewise, he does not consider the possible influence of the 
financial press on economic bubbles.  
 
The hypothesis of the rationality of stock market agents in Brunnermeier’s model 
implies that the market is predictable. This issue has been the subject of debate and 
controversy in recent years, with the emergence of “behavioural economics” that 
rejects the hypothesis of rational agents in financial markets.  
 
One of the notable exponents of this approach is Andrei Shleifer, who constructed a 
complete alternative model on the occurrence of bubbles. In general, this approach has 
focused closely on the factors that influence general opinion forming. Andrei Shleifer 
himself and Sendhil Mullainathan (2004) theorized on the influence of the press in 
general, rather than the financial press, and considered it as a news market. 
 
Brad Barber and Odean Terrance1 directly found relationships between the influence of 
the press and investors. They considered that investors make decisions on the shares 
of companies that are familiar to them. This familiarity is closely linked to the press.  
 
An analysis by Paul R. Milgrom (1981) also helps us to understand the effects of press 
influence on investment decisions. He assessed the impact of good and bad news on 
share prices, from the perspective of information economics.  
 
                                                          
1 See Barber and Odean (2007). These authors have published previous papers on this subject.  
 
Milgrom took a variable that represented ‘quality’ or ‘intrinsic value’ in a rational 
expectations or adverse selection model and formulated the relationships of more or 
less favourable for two pieces of news (signals).  
 
According to P. Milgrom, one application of his basic model deals directly with the 
impact of news on a company’s stock market value. He states that favourable news 
about profit expectations leads to a rise in share price. 
 
Another application that Milgrom describes is the ‘games of persuasion’ in which, for 
example, a regulated company tries to influence the regulator by selectively providing 
information that is relevant to a decision. In one version of the model, at equilibrium, 
the company provides the most favourable information and withholds the least 
favourable. If the communication between the parties is without costs and the regulator 
detects that information is being withheld, then he/she will adopt a strategy of extreme 
scepticism. Thus, he/she will assume that the company is withholding the most 
unfavourable information. The company’s expected response will be to adopt a 
strategy of full disclosure.  
 
In subsequent papers, Milgrom (2008) returns to the subject of persuasion with a study 
that contains less mathematical formulae. He describes a more complex reality and 
revises the applications that refer to “games of persuasion”. Good news on the stock 
market could focus, for example, on the development of new technology for a 
company. The issue that is discussed is how the “game of persuasion” develops in 
terms of information between the company manager and the potential investor.  
 
Of course, it is not always possible to transmit information. An investor may not have 
the ability to assess and analyse in depth the information that is provided. In this case, 
reputation comes into play. Accounting companies, auditors, investment banks, 
professional offices, etc. depend on their reputation, as this is the signal that serves for 
their evaluation.  
 
Another consideration is that the value of a piece of information may emerge once the 
event has passed. For example, a strike is an eventuality, but if one occurs we could 
consider that not enough information was provided about the problem. Therefore, 
companies have to assess which information they release.  
 
We should also consider that competition within sectors affects information. For 
example, a monopoly is in a position to provide only the information that it wants to 
release. 
   ...................................................     
 
Companies’ communication activities can be explained in terms of a communication 
strategy. In relation to information, companies have traditionally feared the competition 
and the tax office above all, and they aim to build a reputation in the eyes of their 
stakeholders.  
 
Reputation can be defined as the stakeholders’ evaluation of an organization. Thus, the 
reason for a reputation should be sought in the stakeholders’ experiences of a 
company’s daily operations, its brand, marketing and public image. This information 
may come from the media or through word of mouth.  
 
The stakeholder theory states that corporations must act for the benefit of all 
“interested parties” – not just the shareholders. A company’s stakeholders or interest 
groups include any individual or group who could influence or is influenced by company 
practices. Stakeholders could be suppliers, consumers, employees, shareholders, 
financial institutions, the government and the media. 
 
As David L. Deephouse (2000) and other authors2 have stated, reputation can give a 
company a competitive advantage. For example, it can help to acquire more clients, 
improve bank interests, increase share price, etc. Companies increasingly try to 
manage this intangible asset through corporate communications departments. 
 
This conclusion is confirmed in various papers on business communication strategy. 
One important study is that by David Deephouse in which he presents a company’s 
reputation as a strategy that incorporates mass communication theory and business 
administration. 
 
Deephouse considers that reputation is one way to achieve a competitive strategy. His 
study focused on commercial banks, in which he found that reputation had a positive 
influence on performance.  
 
David Deephouse takes as a starting point communication research on aspects such 
as audiences, media organizations and the resulting effects on audiences. In this field, 
it has been shown that the media gather public information on companies and influence 
public opinion of these corporations. The media not only act as vehicles for transmitting 
information, but also as active agents of information and opinion forming.  
 
Many journalists have questioned this conclusion, but the codes of ethics have been 
drawn up with this potential influence in mind.  
 
The assumption that the media influence knowledge and opinion applies to reputation, 
as media coverage is a reasonable indicator of knowledge and opinion about 
companies in a specific period.  
 
The information that appears in the media comes from various sources, but above all 
from the company itself, in a theoretical framework defined by asymmetric information. 
In general, reputation facilitates the creation of value, as it is a positive sign for clients, 
shareholders, employees, workers, suppliers and researchers, among others. The 
strategic benefits are as follows: firstly, the possibility of reducing costs (loans, 
suppliers, etc.); secondly, the opportunity to establish higher prices; and, finally, the 
option of creating competitive barriers. In short, the aim of the communication strategy 
is to improve the business performance.  
 
                                                          
2 Helm, Macmillan, Srivastava, Crosby, McInish, Wood and Capraro (2000) 
 
R. Vergin and M. Qoronfleh (1998) analysed the relationship between business returns 
and reputation according to data in Fortune magazine. They found a positive 
relationship between the reputation index and performance on the stock market. Over 
fourteen years, they examined the companies in the first ten places of the Fortune 
ranking. They found that the year after a company appeared in the ranking, its stock 
market value rose by as much as 20.1 per cent. The average increase on the S&P 
stock market index was 13.1 per cent. Of course, this increase in value means that 
shares are more expensive. Investors who buy expensive shares could find that the 
returns on each dividend decrease due to the company results.  
 
In the same line, Thomas Schuster (2003) verified the positive effect that information in 
the financial press can have on quotations. This can lead to an increase in share price 
and a reduction in returns. He also indicated that pressure on prices comes from new 
and inexperienced investors. 
    .......................... 
In particular, communication with shareholders is a specialized task that is carried out 
by Investor Relations. Investor Relations (IR)3 is a term that describes the office or 
department in a company that deals with shareholders. The tasks of IR include aspects 
of communication as well as finance, law and commerce. 
 
This specialization was first introduced in the USA in the 1960s. It became widespread 
from the 1970s to the 1990s as a result of the growth in institutional funds, which are 
the main aim of communication in IR. The traditional role of IR professionals is to 
ensure that the prices of a company’s shares are seen in a favourable light. 
 
IR departments also devote much of their work to the media, as the perception of a 
company is due, to a great extent, to its image in the financial press.  
 
Aeron Davis (2006) observed and analysed the relations between the IR and investors, 
from a sociological perspective of the media. To attain this objective, he examined the 
changing influence of London Stock Exchange news reported by the media. He also 
interviewed over one hundred people in the three subgroups of people who are most 
affected by this subject: company managers in charge of investor relations (IR), 
financial journalists and professional investors.  
 
The journalists who were interviewed have quite limited access to companies’ chief 
executives and financial directors. In fact, companies present reports to financial 
analysts and fund managers before they release them to the media. Some companies 
prefer individual contact with the press to public presentations. In any case, companies 
follow financial information closely.  
 
The media are also in contact with financial analysts and fund managers. The 
interviewees recognised that the media are very important for guarding a company’s 
reputation. Although the key factor for investment decisions is considered the opinion 
of senior managers, a company’s media image reflects general expectations and can 
sometimes help to trigger a decision.  
                                                          
3 See Inoue, 2009 
 
The most important communication task is considered the management of bad news at 
times of crisis; as such news can have a very negative impact on a company. 
 
Companies, particularly large ones, are believed to have a considerable capacity to 
affect the financial press. It can be very difficult for small companies to gain coverage in 
the financial media. 
 
There is extensive news coverage in situations of crisis, so that companies have to try 
to be treated positively by regional media.  
 
In financial information, journalists clearly consider that the largest companies and/or 
those with the greatest investment potential are the most “noticeable” to their readers.  
 
The excessive influence of business sources in the news is often criticised: “The 
national financial press are written for the city by the city”. This is attributed to the 
dependence of the press on advertising.  
 
The fund managers who were interviewed believed that the financial press had only a 
limited influence on investment decisions. In comparison to journalists, fund managers 
have more access to chief executives. They are also in a better position to analyse 
companies. One of the difficulties faced by journalists is insufficient financial training to 
analyse companies. 
 
The press continues to have an important influence, as it is the only source of 
information for many small shareholders. The media coverage of small and medium 
sized companies also has a considerable impact, as analysts may have little 
information about such enterprises.  
 
In accordance with Davis, the overall importance of the financial media has decreased 
in terms of its impact on quotations and its influence on investment decisions. 
Nevertheless, financial media continue to be treated with caution by companies and 
are closely followed by the investment community as they can occasionally have a 
considerable impact on investment patterns.  
 
Analysts are frequently associated with financial institutions. Consequently, their 
analysis may be affected by their institution’s interests in the companies under 
examination. 
 
    ..................................... 
 
Robert Shiller (2000) is the economist who has addressed the relationship between 
economic bubbles and the financial press in the most direct, global way. Shiller 
analysed the impact of the financial media on the stock markets in various stages and 
in different countries. He interviewed investors and concluded that the financial media 
did not generally have an influence on the immediate decision of investors, in the 
sense that no rule could be deduced. 
 
Nevertheless, Shiller considered that the media participate actively in the formation of 
public opinion and in different categories of thought. In addition, the media create the 
environment in which market events take place. 
 
He illustrated with examples the fact that the media, who have to provide topics of 
interest to the public, are essential propagators of speculative movements in share 
prices. Shiller considers that the concept of feedback that occurs in speculative 
bubbles is fundamental, and that the media play an essential role in this area.  
     .......................... 
The analysis of the relationship between journalism and power has also looked at the 
influence of the press on society, which has a particular effect on investors. The work 
of Noam Chomsky is particularly notable in this area. In conjunction with Edward 
Herman, Chomsky developed the Propaganda Model (PM)4 for international 
information, which has been applied in the field of finance5.  
 
The basic proposition of PM is that news systematically favours the state elite and 
corporate interests through the action of five structural filters: ownership, advertising, 
the dependence of information sources, the threat of lawsuits and ideological 
conformity (anti-communism, anti-terrorism, etc.).  
 
In Herman and Chomsky’s model (1988), the media are considered a structural 
component of a nexus with the power elite, as they share an interest in perpetuating 
the social conditions that are most favourable to the accumulation of capital, regardless 
of whether this objective is compatible with social justice or the democratic process.  
 
According to Thomson (2009), when this model is applied to the field of financial 
information, the following aspects need to be considered and resolved: 
 
1. The complexity of the alliance between the media and the state elite.  
2. A consideration of how filtering occurs, as there are many real-time events on 
the stock market. 
3. The relationships between journalists and information sources for events that, 
due to their nature, can only be understood by experts. One example is the 
value of derivatives. 
4. The media are designed for different audiences. For example, the specialized 
financial press is not accessible to the general public. 
5. Global financial markets and modern communication systems. 
 
In terms of the relationship between the media and the elite, we should stress that the 
main international news groups continue to be family businesses. Hence, their 
individual interests are necessarily limited. Furthermore, if the vector “shareholder” is 
extended to include financial bakers, the potential influence of financial groups could be 
considerable.  
 
                                                          
4 Year 1988. 
5 See Thomson (2009). 
The problems described in points 2 and 3 are outside the scope of this paper, as here 
we focus only on what happens to the value of company shares on the stock market. In 
relation to information such as that on events in the derivatives market, the media, in 
reporting these events, are considered to play an ideological role. They reinforce the 
prevalent discourses that legitimize the models of financial policy, regulation, new 
investment technologies, financial instruments and specific commercial practices. 
 
Price movements tend to be reported in the media as external events that are 
attributable to the “markets”, as if they were an impersonal force of nature. The media 
naturalize the values as facts from a supposed objective market, whilst the processes 
that sustain the prices become opaque and mysterious. Once this cycle has begun, the 
media “noise” may create opportunities for speculation, as noise and rumours can 
move prices. As Thomson states (2009, p. 86), the impact of financial information is not 
a function of its accuracy or reliability, but a question of whether investors consider it to 
be relevant to their trading decisions.  
 
As we have seen in Davis, analysts can also be affected. Therefore, the system of 
filters described in the PM model exists, at least partially.  
 
In terms of financial information satisfying the interests of the elite, the filters vary 
depending on whether they deal with the state, the industrial sectors or the financial 
sector. For example, in the 2008 crisis, the financial press did not criticize the financial 
sector or the capitalist system (Thompson 2009). 
 
The financial media play a potentially important role in the creation of a climate of 
investor expectations, perceptions and market sentiment. However, according to 
Thompson, the recognition of these processes complicates the conception of 
representation and filtering that is implicit in the PM. 
 
Therefore, despite its importance as an analytical tool, the PM model does not fully 
represent the complexity of the way economic information functions. 
. 
    .......................... 
 
Surprisingly, at the other end of the ideological spectrum to Chomsky, the most 
neoliberal economists have also turned to politics. Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales 
(2002) (2003) are proof of this fact. They considered that the incentive system is 
insufficient to ensure that the media report adequately on corporate governance. On 
the basis of this concept, Dyck, Zingales and Moss (2008) identified asymmetric 
information as the source of the problem, and focussed on muckraking6 and politics. 
Voter theory and, in general, public finance theory and public choice theory provide 
good analytical tools for problems of collective choice. They may also be applicable to 
considerations of the media as a sector in which, as in politics, collective consumption 
occurs. The media can contribute to reducing the problem of regulatory capture by 
companies in regulated sectors. However, it is not clear whether news corporations can 
in turn become captives of the interests in regulated sectors.  
                                                          
6 Journalistic research to expose bad practice in public life. 
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) carried out an economic analysis of media bias caused 
by reputation. Their study also had a marked focus on politics. They concluded that 
competition between news corporations can reduce bias. However, if we consider all of 
the stakeholders involved in news corporations, we can see that the sector is so 
complex that the economic analysis of these authors is not always evident.  
 
At the other end of the ideological spectrum, political and sociological trends 
oversimplify the issue. 
 
2. Results of the analysis  
 
On the basis of papers by authors such as R. Shiller, A. Davis and Perramon (2009 
and 2011, a, b, c), we have presented arguments and evidence that the financial press 
does influence economic bubbles. We have demonstrated that this influence is such 
that it drives both stock market investors’ demand for information and the supply of 
financial information.  
 
The fact that certain markets are characterized by asymmetric information affects the 
news that is offered. In contrast, when we review the hypothesis of the rationality of 
financial agents, considerations emerge that affect the demand for information in 
particular.  
 
Information is needed to evaluate companies by estimating their future returns. 
Nevertheless, this brings us up against an uncertainty problem that frequently cannot 
be resolved, as estimations depend not only on the most likely forecasts, which may be 
made on the basis of very weak knowledge of future factors, but also on the confidence 
with which they were made.7 In these circumstances, the problem is not that the 
investor does not want or have to be rational, it is that rationality simply cannot be 
attained8. 
However, the unsolvable problem of uncertainty can be approached in various ways. 
The correct way is by devoting time and effort to gain knowledge of the investment 
under analysis. Investors such as Warren Buffet follow this path9. The incorrect way is 
to use the shortcut of intuition. This attitude to uncertainty could be called “irrational” or 
herding10. 
 
One of the most trustworthy sources that the “irrational” investor uses is the state of 
public opinion¸ which is where the influence of the financial information published by 
the press becomes clear11.  
 
The main source of information on a listed company is the company itself. Increasingly, 
firms rely on specialized departments to communicate with shareholders and with the 
financial press in particular. Companies report to investment funds, which tend to be 
                                                          
7 Perramon (2012) 
8 Perramon (2012) has formally defined the uncertainty problem faced by investors. 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
11 Ibid 
their main shareholders, to financial analysts, and to the financial press. Some 
regulating organizations determine criteria for the information provided by companies12. 
 
The financial press directly influences small shareholders. However, major 
shareholders or investment funds are also interested in finding out whether the state of 
public opinion is favourable, as a company’s media image reflects general expectations 
and can also sometimes help to trigger a decision.  
 
Information on the economic and financial development of a company is only one part 
of the policy and strategy of business communication. Companies have to respond to 
the concerns of the stakeholders or interest groups (suppliers, consumers, employees, 
shareholders, financial institutions, government and the media), not just those of the 
shareholders.  
 
Companies’ efforts to communicate with their stakeholders can take many forms, 
depending on the sector. Some companies focus more on their image for the client, 
others for the government, the media, etc. In fact, reputation is linked to the problem of 
asymmetric information that is a characteristic of certain markets. In general, a 
company’s reputation cannot be separated from specifically economic or financial 
aspects. 
 
Regulated sectors are a particularly relevant case in terms of financial information. In 
these sectors, a company’s economic development also depends on its ability to 
capture regulatory agencies. Regulatory capture is based precisely on the maintenance 
of asymmetric information between the regulator, the regulated company and the 
consumer.  
 
As expected, to achieve their objectives such companies are active in lobbying in 
general, and particularly in providing information to the financial press. The reasons for 
this greater level of communication activity can be supported by statistical tests, 
including an analysis of the predominance in the general and financial press of the 
IBEX 35 and Dow Jones companies13, and an analysis of the financial newspaper with 
the biggest circulation.  
    ....................... 
 
In general, the financial press is biased towards information about the major companies 
that take up most of the financial news. However, the financial press has the greatest 
direct influence on investors and/or financial analysts when it reports on small 
companies for which little information is available.  
 
Another problem is journalists’ inevitable lack of independence with respect to 
information sources, which ends up creating a feedback loop. Journalists obtain most 
of their information from analysts’ reports, from corporate communication departments 
and from investment funds. In turn, analysts obtain their professional information from 
the financial media and institutional sources. Furthermore, analysts are probably not 
                                                          
12 In Spain, this is called the National Securities Market Commission (Comissió Nacional del Mercat de 
Valors, CNMV). 
independent, as the entities to which they belong may have interests in the company 
under analysis. This is particularly likely if the entity is a bank. 
In the aforementioned system, there is an information feedback loop in which the 
market perception converges and can move the market, with no regard for quotations 
that are based on fundamental values. This contributes to bubbles and crashes14. 
 
R. Shiller15 agrees that, above all, the press and the financial media influence the 
formation of public opinions. Thus, they contribute to creating the environment in which 
market events take place. Shiller also noted the key role of the feedback that occurs in 
speculative bubbles. He states that, as a result of having to offer topics that are of 
interest to the public, the media are key propagators of speculative share price 
movements.  
 
A consideration of sector biases supports these hypotheses, as the need for the media 
to provide interesting topics is fed by the continuous supply of information from these 
sectors.  
 
The Spanish financial and property bubble and subsequent crisis in 2008 is a clear 
example of some sectors’ control of the information supply. In this bubble, the sensible, 
clear-sighted opinion of certain institutions and experts was silenced by the media 
noise, which was fed by the sectors that were benefitting from this speculative process. 
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